Abstract-In sensor networks, an intruder (i.e., compromised node) identified and isolated in one place can be relocated and/or duplicated to other places to continue attacks; hence, detection and isolation of the same intruder or its clones may have to be conducted repeatedly, wasting scarce network resources. Therefore, once an intruder is identified, it should be known to all innocent nodes such that the intruder or its clones can be recognized when appearing elsewhere. However, secure, efficient and scalable sharing of intruder information remains a challenging and unsolved problem. To address this problem, we propose a three-tier framework, consisting of a verifiable intruder reporting (VIR) scheme, a quorum based caching (QBC) scheme for efficiently propagating intruder reports to the whole network, and a collaborative Bloom Filter (CBF) scheme for handling intruder information locally. Extensive analysis and evaluations are also conducted to verify the efficiency and scalability of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to unattended deployment environment and absence of tamper resistance, sensor networks are vulnerable to various attacks. In response, schemes have been proposed to identify intruders (i.e., compromised nodes) misbehaving in routing [1] , localization [2] , and other scenarios [3] , [4] . Once an intruder is identified, it is isolated by its detectors. However, this is inadequate. Nodes other than these detectors should also be aware of the intruder; otherwise, the intruder can be relocated or duplicated to other places to continue attacks.
To share intruder information with all sensor nodes, the detectors may generate and flood intruder reports to the whole network, directly or through trusted membership servers; other nodes receive and record the reports to maintain their knowledge of intruders. This approach, however, has following security and performance issues: (I.1) Intruders may fake false reports to revoke innocent nodes or repeatedly broadcast false reports to drain network resources; although trusted membership servers can be used to filter false reports, these servers may become attractive targets of attacks. (I.2) If the network scale is large and/or the network needs to operate for a long time (e.g., the network is deployed for long-term surveillance in a hostile area) and hence requires a large number of sensor nodes be deployed to accomplish a long network lifetime, the potential number of compromised nodes is also large, which may result in frequent flooding of intruder information even without fake reports. (I.3) If the number of intruders is large, maintaining an intruder list in each node may cause high storage overhead. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any secure, efficient and scalable solution reported in the literature that can deal with all the above issues.
To address the intruder information sharing problem, we propose three schemes in this paper: (S.1) a verifiable intruder reporting (VIR) scheme, which distributedly generates intruder reports that are verifiable by any node, and can prevent malicious nodes from arbitrarily accusing innocent nodes unless the majority number of neighbors of an innocent node have been compromised; (S.2) a quorum-based caching (QBC) scheme, which efficiently propagates intruder information through caching intruder information in selected nodes and infrequently updating the information throughout the network; and (S.3) a collaborative Bloom Filter (CBF) scheme, which consumes only small storage space at each node and meanwhile leverages localized collaboration to enable accurate identification of intruders.
To facilitate the execution of the above three schemes and also to integrate them together, we further propose a framework that contains three tiers of interacting entities: a dedicated membership server (DMS) on the top tier, connecting to the network occasionally at random places to avoid being tracked and attacked; a small number of sensor nodes on the second tier, acting as temporary intruder information caches (IICs); and other ordinary sensor nodes on the bottom tier. Extensive analysis and simulations are conducted to evaluate the efficiency and scalability of the proposed solution.
In the following, Section II presents the system model. Section III provides an overview of the proposed framework, which is followed by description, analysis and evaluation of VIR, CBF and QBC in Section IV, V, VI, respectively. Finally, the paper concludes in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. Network Assumptions
We consider a sensor network composed of a network controller and a large number of densely-deployed resourceconstrained sensor nodes. The controller connects to the network every now and then at arbitrary positions (i.e., it need not be connected to the network at all the time or be at a fixed place). In addition, the network has the following features: (i) Each sensor node knows its own location (via GPS based or 978-1-4244-1777-3/08/$25.00 © IEEE
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non-GPS based localization schemes). (ii)
The network needs to operate for a long time and is composed of static nodes, mobile sensor nodes, or a mixture of static or mobile sensor nodes. Mobile sensor nodes may be relocated to respond to a new task. Static sensor nodes may be deployed every now and then to maintain a network lifetime that is longer than the lifetime of a single sensor node. (iii) The network has a relatively static topology. Normally, there are two cases that cause a topology change: relocation of mobile sensors and deployments of new static sensor nodes. However, these happen infrequently.
B. Security Assumptions
We assume that the controller is trustworthy and cannot be compromised. Sensor nodes are innocent before they are deployed, but can be compromised at a certain rate after deployment. Existing intrusion detection schemes [1] , [2] 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework (shown in Fig. 1 ) is composed of the following three tiers of entities:
• On the top tier is a dedicated membership server (DMS), which aggregates and periodically disseminates intruder information to the whole network. Due to its critical role, the DMS may become an attractive target of attacks. Specifically, the adversary may locate the DMS and then either compromise the DMS directly or block the communication between the DMS and the rest of the network. To protect the DMS, it is not connected to the network all the time. Instead, it goes online every now and then at different places randomly. The protection makes it hard for the adversary to trace, attack, or isolate the DMS.
• On the middle tier are intruder information caches (IICs), which are a small number of sensor nodes picked from all sensor nodes in the network. They temporarily cache new intruder information when the DMS is offline. As ordinary sensor nodes, they could be compromised by the adversary. If compromised, the intruder information cached by these IICs may be removed or modified, which is addressed in our solution through (i) verifying intruder information to prevent faking or fabricating, and (ii) duplicating intruder information to maintain high availability of the information.
• On the bottom tier are ordinary sensor nodes, which collaboratively identify intruders and report intruder information to IICs. Sensor nodes maintain their own intruder information based on the periodical updates disseminated by the DMS, and collaboratively determine the legitimacy of sensor nodes who join their neighborhoods; they may also query IICs to obtain latest intruder information when necessary. To summarize, interactions between these entities include: Sensor nodes collaboratively generate intruder reports that can be verified by any other nodes, and send them to a certain set of IICs. Every time interval l, the DMS queries IICs to collect the reports for intruders that have been identified since the previous query, and then disseminates the IDs of these intruders to all sensor nodes in a secure manner. Upon receiving it, every sensor node records these intruders; if the sensor node is also an IIC, it removes these intruders from its cache (since it is not necessary to cache the information). When a node joins a neighborhood, the neighbors can use their own knowledge about identified intruder to determine if the new arrival is intruder or not. If the neighbors need more accurate intruder information (i.e., the information about intruders detected since last dissemination by the DMS), they may query a certain set of IICs to obtain it.
IV. VERIFIABLE INTRUDER REPORTING (VIR) A. Basic Idea
As pointed out by previous work [5] , [6] , intruder reports generated by a single node are not trustable since the reporting node itself could have been compromised. Therefore, detectors should collaborate to identify intruders, and identification conclusions should be made based on the agreement among the majority of the detectors. After that, intruder information should be known to non-detecting nodes. Hence, we propose a verifiable intruder reporting (VIR) scheme, which works as follows:
(i) When a node is deployed or relocated to a place, it authenticates with every 1-hop neighbor and disseminates shares of its private key to these neighbors. (ii) Later, if this node is identified as an intruder by the majority of its 1-hop neighbors, these neighbors can collaboratively derive the private key, which can be used as the intruder report. (iii) Intruder reports can be verified by every node based on a small amount of secrets preloaded to these nodes.
In this way, verification of intruder reports is easy and decentralized (no need for online trusted membership managers), and the cost for transferring reports is low. The VIR scheme is designed based on a novel combination of the secret sharing [7] , the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [8] , [9] and the Merkle hash tree [10] techniques:
• The above steps (i) and (ii) are performed only by 1-hop neighbors of newly deployed/relocated nodes as well as 1-hop neighbors of intruders. They do not happen frequently but have high security requirements. Therefore, the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and the secret sharing techniques are applied to implement these steps.
• Verification of intruder reports is performed by a large number of nodes, and thus should be performed efficiently. ECC-based verification is still slower than its symmetric cryptography-based counterpart, though ECC has been regarded as the most efficient public key cryptographic system [11] . Therefore, we adopt the low-cost Merkle hash tree technique to implement this step.
B. Detailed Description

1) System Initialization:
Let E/F p be an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b over a finite field F p , G be a q-order group of points of E/F p , and H be a hash function mapping an arbitrary string to a point in G [12] . The DMS has a private key K − s and a public key K
Before each sensor node (with ID u) is deployed, it is preloaded with the following information:
• H(u): the hash of u. This is computed offline in order to reduce computation overhead at sensor nodes.
: the private and public keys of sensor node u.
• Hash tree values for authentication of K − u . Similar to the idea proposed in [13] , a merkle hash tree with hashed private keys of all sensor nodes as leaves are constructed. Let the root of the tree be R. For each node u, assuming the nodes on the path from hash(u|K
Node u is also preloaded with R and the auxiliary values. Note that, the auxiliary values can be used to verify the validity of
: the certificate of sensor node u. After the sensor network is deployed, assuming the network is secure for a short time, each node obtains the actual IDs and locations of all other nodes within its 2-hop neighborhood. Then, each node broadcasts its public key and hash tree auxiliary values to its 1-hop neighbors. In addition, each node (denoted as u, where u is its ID), arbitrarily constructs a t = n/2 (assuming the number of its 1-hop neighbors is n) degree polynomial (over finite field F p ) denoted as
2) Node Addition and Relocation: When a sensor node (say, node u) is newly deployed or relocated, it first needs to establish trust relations with its 1-hop neighbors and obtain information about all nodes in its 2-hop neighborhood. For this purpose, node u and its 1-hop neighbors exchange their IDs and locations, and exchange their public keys and hash tree auxiliary values and verify these data based on the certificates preloaded to them; each of these neighbors also sends back the IDs and locations of its own 1-hop neighbors.
In addition, node u needs to disseminate the shares of its private key to its 1-hop neighbors as follows: Assuming these neighbors are v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n , node u arbitrarily constructs a t = n/2 degree polynomial f u (x) as in the system initialization phase, and sends to each 1-hop neighbor v i a share f u (v i ). Different from the system initialization phase, where the network is secure, this message should be communicated in a secure way. For example, this message could be encrypted with the public key of node v i by using the EIGamal algorithm [14] .
Moreover, each 1-hop neighbor (say, node v) of node u needs to disseminate a share of its own private key to u. To achieve this, node v uses its current polynomial, denoted as f v (x) to compute share f v (u) and sends it to node u securely. Verification of Shares Disseminated: A compromised node (say, node u) may provide false shares of its private key, or construct f u (x) with an order higher than t, to prevent its 1-hop neighbors from deriving its private key. To deal with this misbehavior, we propose share verification protocol as follows:
(i) Node u broadcasts the IDs and locations of its 1-hop neighbors. Upon receiving the information, each 1-hop neighbor v i searches its own list of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors; if any 1-hop neighbor claimed by node u is not found in the list, node u is considered as dishonest (compromised).
where l i is a Lagrange coefficient defined as
Using T K u,vi , u generates the following data to verify the share of v i
and broadcasts it to all 1-hop neighbors.
compares the received one with the one computed by itself. If the two values are the same, it proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, it considers u as malicious and launches the process for intruder accusation. (iv) When a 1-hop neighbor v i receives all n verification messages, it randomly puts these reports into two groups such that each group has at least t + 1 verification messages and these groups have the minimum overlap. For each group, the 1-hop neighbor checks if 
If a neighbor v j has received t + 1 or more correct shares of f u (x), f u (x) can be derived using Lagrange interpolation, and thus 
, and disseminates the report to a set of IICs. Note that, any sensor node receiving the report can verify it using the hash tree-based technique [13] . If a compromised node sends a fraudulent intruder report against an innocent node or tamper a pass-by report, it can be detected and dropped.
C. Overhead Analysis
In the sub-section, we analyze the storage, computation and communication overhead when the VIR scheme is deployed, based on the following assumptions: (i) 160-bit ECC recommended by SECG and the ECDSA algorithm are adopted for signature generation and verification; (ii) the ID of each node takes 2 bytes, which supports up to 65535 nodes in a network; (iii) each sensor node has n = 20 1-hop neighbors, which is assumed in the literature for highly dense networks (the cost can be reduced for networks with lower density). For computation and communication cost, we only discuss the cost incurred for node addition and relocation, since it is the major source of computation and communication cost in the VIR scheme. Secondly, in the VIR scheme, each node needs to store the IDs and locations of all nodes in its 2-hop neighborhood. Based on the assumption each node has 20 1-hop neighbors, each node will have approximately 80 nodes in its 2-hop neighborhood. Assuming a location is represented by a pair of integers, each with 2 bytes, and a node ID takes 2 bytes, the information of each 1-hop or 2-hop neighbor takes 6 bytes. As a result, it takes a node 480 bytes to store the information of all nodes in its 2-hop neighborhood. Thirdly, before a node u disseminates its shares, it needs to construct and store f u (x) with 11 coefficients, which take 220 bytes. To summarize, the total storage space is around 2436 bytes, which is affordable by current generation of sensor nodes. 
V. COLLABORATIVE BLOOM FILTER (CBF)
The DMS periodically disseminates reports of intruders identified since the last dissemination, and this information should be recorded by each sensor node. However, as time elapses, the number of intruders increases, and recording these intruders may consume a large portion of sensor nodes' storage, which is undesirable since the primary function of a sensor node is sensing and processing data and security schemes should occupy as little resource as possible. To address this issue, we propose a collaborative Bloom Filter (CBF) scheme in this section. Before describing the scheme, a simple Bloom Filter-based scheme is first presented as the preliminary.
A. A Simple Bloom Filter-based (SBF) Scheme
Bloom Filter [17] is a probabilistic data structure for testing the membership of a set. It uses a m-bit string and k independent hash functions to represent a set S. Each hash function uniformly maps an element in S to a number in the range {0, 1, · · · , m − 1}, which corresponds to a bit in the string. A simple Bloom Filter-based scheme works as follows:
Assume N is the number of sensor nodes in the network and at most cN (0 < c < 1) nodes can be compromised. Before each node is deployed, it is randomly preload with k hash functions. This can be achieved by preloading a single hash function hash(.) (which can be reused by other security schemes such as VIR) and k independent keys K 1 , · · · , K k ; when a value x needs to be hashed, the hash value is calculated as hash(x|K i ) where i = 1, · · · , k. Each sensor node also initializes its Bloom Filter to a m-bit all-zero string.
When a sensor node receives an intruder list from the DMS, it performs add operation; i.e., each of the k hash functions is applied on each intruder ID to get k results, corresponding to k bits in the string that are set to 1. When the node wants to verify the legitimacy of a newly deployed or relocated node v (i.e., testing if node v is an intruder or not), it performs a query operation. That is, each of the k hash functions is applied on v to get k bits; if and only if at least one of these bits is 0 in the string, v is considered as good (not an intruder).
Due to storage limit in sensor nodes, m should not be too large. Based on the relation among m, k, and cN shown in Eq. (1) [18], assuming k is 1, 2, 3 , or 4 (to keep m from being too large), the resultant false positive probability is 0.5, 0.25, 0.125 or 0.0625, respectively.
These positive probabilities are too large. Hence, we propose in the following a collaborative Bloom Filter-based scheme, which leverages collaboration among neighboring nodes to reduce false positive probability while not increasing the size of Bloom Filters.
B. A Collaborative Bloom Filter-Based (CBF) Scheme 1) Basic Idea:
To test the legitimacy of a newly deployed or relocated node v, the testing node first searches its own Bloom Filter for v. If v is not found, it is immediately considered as good. Otherwise, neighbors of the testing node are invited to collaboratively test v. Specifically, the testing node broadcasts a query message to its neighbors, each neighbor searches its own Bloom Filter for v, and sends back the result to the testing node. Having received all replies from neighbors, the testing node counts the number of neighbors claiming v as good. If and only if the number is greater than a certain threshold (denoted as γ), v is considered as good.
Obviously, the challenge of designing the CBF scheme lies in the determination of γ such that the false positive probability (if the tested node is found bad) or the false negative probability (if the tested node is found good) is lower than a certain bound pre-defined by the network user. To handle this challenge, we next derive the probabilities of false positive and false negative, and present an algorithm to determine γ.
2) False Positive Probability and False Negative Probability: We use the following notations:
• p: false positive probability when using a single Bloom Filter • q: probability that a neighbor is innocent (good) • x: number of neighbors replying "the tested node is good" • y: number of neighbors replying "the tested node is bad" • p(T G): probability that the tested node is actually good • p(T B): probability that the tested node is actially bad • p(CG|T B) (false negative probability): probability that the tested node is considered good if it is actually bad • p(CB|T G) (false positive probability): probability that the tested node is considered bad if it is actually good When a neighbor of a testing node receives a query for collaborative testing, its response is determined by two factors: whether the neighbor itself is innocent (good) or compromised (bad), and the false positive probability when using its own Bloom Filter. Naturally we assume that a good neighbor cooperates and reports the exact result of searching its own Bloom Filter, but the result reported by a bad neighbor is reverse to the exact result of searching. Specifically, the response pattern is shown in Table I . For instance, assuming the tested node is good, a good neighbor replies "the tested node is good" with probability 1 − p, and "the tested node is bad" with probability p; a bad neighbor replies "the tested node is good" with probability p, and "the tested node is bad" with probability 1 − p. Therefore, it follows that, if the number of replies saying good (x) is greater than threshold γ and thus the tested node is considered good, the false negative probability of the decision is:
On the other hand, if x is less than threshold γ and thus the tested node is considered bad, the false positive probability of the decision is:
3) Determining Threshold (γ) to Minimize the Bloom Filter Size (m):
Assume that parameters N (the total number of sensor nodes), c (the percentage of nodes being compromised), q (the probability that a single node is compromised), x+y (the number of neighbors of a testing node) are known; F P u and F N u are the user-defined upper bounds for the probabilities of false positive and false negative, respectively. We present an algorithm to determine threshold γ that can minimize system parameter k (and hence the size of Bloom Filter m) while keeping the probabilities of false positive and false negative below F P u and F N u :
(i) k is initialized to 1.
(ii) For every possible value of x, the false positive probability (assuming the tested node is considered bad when x neighbors replying good) and the false negative probability (assuming the tested node is considered bad when x neighbors replying good) are computed using Eq. (3) and Eq. (2), respectively. The results are placed in two lists, i.e., L p for false positive probabilities and L n for false negative probabilities. Both lists are indexed by x. (iii) L p is searched to find out the maximum value of x denoted as x max such that, for any x ≤ x max , if the tested node is considered bad when x neighbors replying good, the false positive probability is lower than F P u . (iv) Similarly, L n is searched to find out the minimum value of x denoted as x min such that, for any x > x min , if the tested node is considered good when x neighbors replying good, the false negative probability is lower than F N u . (v) If x min ≤ x max , any value in [x min , x max ] can be chosen for γ because:
• If x > γ, the tested node is considered as good using the CBF scheme. Furthermore, since γ ≥ x min , we have x > x min , and therefore, the false negative probability is lower than F N u according to step (iv).
• If x ≤ γ, the tested node is considered as bad using the CBF scheme. Furthermore, since γ ≤ x max , we have x ≤ x max , and therefore, the false positive probability is lower than F P u according to step (iii). Otherwise, k is incremented by and steps (ii)-(iv) are repeated. 10 10
Fig. 2. Examples of CBF
The above algorithm can be further explained with the examples in Fig. 2 . In all these examples, N = 10000, c = 0.2, q = 0.8, and x + y = 16. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , when
−3 , x max is found to be 16 and x min is 2, and hence any value between 2 and 16 can be chosen as γ to make the probability of false positive/negative probability lower than 10 −3 . When F P u = F N u = 10 −4 , x max is still 16 but x min becomes 4, and therefore γ should be chosen from 4 to 16. In both cases, k is found to be 1; according to Eq. (1), the required size of Bloom Filter is only 361 bytes. Fig. 2(b) shows that, when F P u = F N u = 10 −5 , k is found to be 3, x min is 5 and x max is 8. Therefore, γ must be chosen from 5 to 8 to ensure the false positive/negative probability is lower than 10 −5 , and the required size of Bloom Filter is 722 bytes. 
4) Evaluation:
Numeric analysis is conducted to evaluate the performance of CBF, as well as compare the performance with that of SBF and the scheme without using Bloom Filter. In the analysis, parameters are set as follows: c = 0.2, N = 10000, q = 0.8, F P u and F N u varying among {10 −3 , 10 −4 , 10 −5 , 10 −6 }, and the number of 1-hop neighbors is 16. The evaluation results are shown in Table II . As we can see, if no Bloom Filter is used, the storage overhead is 4000 bytes since 16-bit is needed to store each intruder ID and there are totally cN = 2000 intruders. When SBF is applied, the storage can be saved only when the required F P u is high (i.e., 10 −3 or higher); otherwise, it needs more space since parameter k has to be large which in turn makes the Bloom Filter size to also be large. Our proposed CBF scheme, however, can save storage and meanwhile achieving very low false positive/negative probability. Specifically, to make the false positive/negative probability lower than 10 −4 , only 361 bytes are required in each node; to make the probability lower than 10 −5 , only 722 bytes are required.
5) Adaptive Approach:
A Bloom Filter consumes m-bit storage space. When there are few intruders in the network, it may be more space-efficient if we just store the IDs of the intruders in the memory rather than using a Bloom Filter. Therefore, we propose the following adaptive approach:
• If the space used for storing intruder IDs is smaller than m-bit, the ID of intruders are stored directly.
• If the space used for storing intruder IDs grows beyond m-bit, the CBF scheme is adopted.
Note that each node can make a decision on when switch happens independently.
VI. QUORUM-BASED CACHING (QBC)
After an intruder report is generated, it is not sent to the DMS, which is not always online, or broadcast to the whole network, which is not communication-efficient. Instead, the report is sent to some in-network caches (IICs) for temporary storage. In the following, we first present the details of the scheme, which is followed by extensive simulations to evaluate the efficiency of the scheme.
A. The Scheme 1) Establishment and Maintenance of IICs:
We assume the deployment field of the sensor network is a rectangle (Note that the scheme can be easily extended to other topologies), which can be divided into r rows and c columns, resulting in r×c cells. For the example in Fig. 3 , the field has 5 rows and 5 columns, totally 25 cells. In each cell, there is a sensor node called cell head, elected and re-elected by nodes inside the cell through certain collaborative selection algorithms [19] . Because cell heads can be maintained in a localized and selforganized way by sensor nodes, we choose them as IICs. 2) Interactions between IICs and Sensor Nodes: After intruder reports are generated, they are sent to IICs for temporary caching. Several options exist to determine which reports should go to which IICs, and different options result in different system overhead and reliability levels of intruder information. Hence, we establish a quorum structure to allow the network administrator to exploit the tradeoff between the reliability and system overhead. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 3 , the cells in each row form a quorum called reporting quorum. All r reporting quorums in the network are denoted as rq 1 , · · · , rq r . Similarly, the grids in each column also form a quorum called querying quorum, and all c querying quorums are denoted as1 , · · · ,c . Note that any two reporting and querying quorums share a same cell, which is referred to as intersection property. If any intruder report is sent only to one reporting quorum, any query for intruder information sent only to one querying quorum, and no cell fails, the intersection property guarantees that the latest intruder information can be retrieved. In reality, however, both reporting and retrieving procedures may fail; hence, an appropriate level of redundancy is necessary. In the QBC scheme, each intruder report must be sent to n r (n r > 1) reporting quorums, and each query must access n q (n q > 1) querying quorums, where n r and n q are system parameters picked by the network administrator.
When a node needs to report an intruder, it randomly chooses n r reporting quorums, and then sends an intruder report to the nearest IIC in each of the n r reporting quorums via GPSR [20] . As shown in Fig. 3 , node R chooses 3 reporting quorums, and the nearest IICs are IIC (4, 1) , IIC (4, 2) , and IIC (4, 4) . These IICs are called reporting agents. The communication reliability between the a reporting sensor node and its corresponding reporting agents can be achieved using the hand-shake mechanism. After a reporting agent receives the intruder report, it propagates the report in two opposite directions to the next IICs in the same reporting quorum, and so on and so forth.
Similarly, when a node needs to query for the legitimacy of a new neighbor, it randomly chooses nuerying quorums, and then sends a query message to the nearest IIC in each of the nuerying quorums. As shown in Fig. 3 , node Q chooses 3 querying quorums, and the nearest IICs are IIC (1, 2) , IIC (2, 2) , and IIC (5, 2) . These IICs are called querying agents. The communication between the querying node and its corresponding querying agents can also be made reliable. After a querying agent receives the query, it checks its list for the queried node. If a match is found, i.e., the queried node has been reported as an intruder, the corresponding intruder report is returned to the querying node. Otherwise, the querying agent propagates the query in two opposite directions to the next IICs in the same querying quorum, and so on and so forth. If the querying node receives an intruder query result within a certain time-out period (predefined based on the diameter of the network, message propagation speed, and so on), the queried node is considered compromised; otherwise, the node is considered innocent. In order to reduce queries, we also define a query-free period, the length of which is denoted by a system parameter α. Specifically, if the difference between the current time and the time of the last DMS dissemination is less than α, no query message will be send out.
3) Interactions between the DMS and IICs: When the DMS goes online, it queries n q arbitrarily-chosen querying quorums to collect the intruder reports that have been generated since its last query. After that, the DMS disseminates the list of these new intruders to the whole network. As an IIC receives this dissemination, it empties its cache. Note that, secure broadcast schemes such as µTESLA [21] can be applied to secure these DMS disseminations.
B. Performance Evaluation
A custom simulator is developed to evaluate the performance of QBC, which shows the advantage of QBC over the pure flooding-based scheme and how several system parameters affect the performance of QBC. Table III show the system parameters. The time is divided into phases (i.e., intervals between two consecutive broadcasts made by the DMS) with equal length. To protect the integrity of the disseminations of the DMS, the µTESLA scheme is applied. Node compromise occurs at rate R c , and intruder query occurs at rate R q . Further, if a node u is chosen to be an intruder in phase i, we assume that if there is any query for u in phase i, it must happen after the compromise (and hence the desired query result should be "the node has been compromised"). Following performance metrics are measured in simulations: v) is compromised during the current phase, the probability that a node querying the legitimacy of node v can get a reply saying node v is compromised Each experiment is run for 500 times, and the measurements are averaged. The results are reported and explained in the following.
1) Experimental Settings:
2) Comparing QBC with the Pure Flooding-based Scheme: With the pure flooding-based scheme, once an intruder is identified, the detecting node broadcasts an intruder report to the whole network. An efficient cluster-based flooding scheme proposed in [22] is employed to simulate it. With the QBC scheme, the DMS broadcast cost using the µTESLA scheme is considered. In this comparison, we set the phase length (l) to 50 hours, the compromise rate (R c ) to 5 nodes per hour, and vary the query rate (R q ) among {20, 35, 50, 65, 80} nodes per hour. As shown by Fig. 4 , the overhead of QBC is much lower Total # of packets Query rate n q =n r =1 n q =n r =2 n q =n r =3 n q =n r =4 n q =n r =5 flooding Fig. 4 . Comparison between QBC and pure flooding than that of the pure flooding-based scheme when R q ≤ 80 and n r = n q = 5. In fact, only when R q is extremely large, the pure flooding-based scheme may outperform QBC (since the pure flooding-based scheme avoids the need for querying).
3) Impact of n r and n q : As shown in Fig. 5(a) , the average storage overhead and the average reporting overhead both increase as n r increases, and the growth is approximately linear. The overheads also increase as R c increases because more intruders are reported in each phase. Furthermore, these overheads decrease gradually as time evolves, because more sensor nodes are compromised and thus more intruder reports are dropped by compromised nodes. Fig. 5(c) and 5(d) show how the querying overhead changes as R c and R q vary. Particularly, as R c increases, the overhead also decreases because more messages are dropped by compromised nodes. On the other hand, the overhead increases as R q goes up. Fig. 5(e) shows the testing accuracy increases as n r and n q increase. Moreover, the accuracy decreases as R c increases because higher compromise rate results in more messages being dropped, and thus reduces the chance that the intruder query and intruder report against the same node meet.
This study demonstrates that higher accuracy requires larger n r and n q . This, however, brings larger storage and communications overheads. Therefore, n r and n q should be carefully chosen to balance the resultant security and efficiency levels.
4) Impact of Phase Length: As shown in Fig. 6 (a) and 6(b), the storage and reporting overheads increase as l increases because more sensor nodes are compromised in a longer phase. In Fig. 6(c) , the querying overhead demonstrates the same trend due to the similar reason. On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 6(d) , the testing accuracy decreases as l increases because more sensor nodes being compromised in a phase reduces the chance that the intruder query and intruder report against the same sensor node meet.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a three-tier framework for intruder information sharing in sensor networks. The framework consists of a verifiable intruder reporting (VIR) scheme, a quorum-based caching (QBC) scheme for system-wide propagation of intruder information, and a collaborative Bloom Filter (CBF) scheme for local management of intruder information. Extensive analysis and simulation are also conducted to verify the efficiency of the proposed framework as long as the system parameters are carefully chosen.
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